[Congressional Record: November 19, 1999 (Extensions)]
[Page E2487]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr19no99-64]


         NONDISCRIMINATORY RETRANSMISSION CONSENT IN H.R. 1554

                                 ______


                        HON. W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN

                              of louisiana

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, November 18, 1999

  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, as a conferee appointed to H.R. 1554, and as
a proponent of competition, I deliberated long and hard to promote
increased consumer choice in the video marketplace by strengthening the
competitive position of satellite carriers as they go head to head with
incumbent cable operators; however, they are not the only competitors
in the evolving video marketplace.
  Since enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, cable over-
builders have acquired franchises all across the country and have begun
to operate traditional wireline systems. In addition to these familiar
distribution systems, several new digital wireless cable systems, which
use microwave frequencies to transmit programming, also offer consumers
a competitive alternative.
  Although incumbent cable systems still dominate the video
distribution market, satellite carriers continue to gain market share
and, with the advent of local into local, will see even greater
consumer interest in their product.
  Unfortunately, the newer entrants--the over builders and the digital
wireless providers--still face some pretty stiff obstacles in their
efforts to penetrate this market. The single most significant hurdle
they face is access to popular programming at fair prices. This issue
has long-term significance for video competition and my subcommittee
will continue to study this important problem. However, in the short-
term, these new competitors are running into serious retransmission
consent problems that prevent them from expanding as fast as they would
like and that unnecessarily deprive consumers of an alternative choice.
  When attempting to renegotiate retransmission consent contracts,
these new competitors are told they must take other programming
services they do not want. Too frequently, they are told they must
purchase a ``bundle'' of programming that includes the broadcast signal
they want, but also includes programming in which the broadcaster or
his affiliated network has a financial interest. As you might expect,
``bundles'' of programming cost a lot more than a single broadcast
signal, and they take up valuable channel space that the new entrants
would prefer to use for other programming--programming they choose to
carry, not programming they are forced to carry.
  The bottom line is that these ``tying'' arrangements are not
optional, they are forced on these new entrants as the quid pro quo for
obtaining retransmission consent; impose higher programming costs on
new entrants that put them at a competitive disadvantage vis a vis
established players in the market; and take up valuable channel space
which, in the case of wireless operators, is limited to the spectrum
space available.
  If our efforts to increase consumer choice are to succeed, we must go
beyond what we have been able to accomplish in H.R. 1554.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in a pledge to reopen the debate about
nondiscriminatory retransmission consent and agree to study this matter
further to see what additional steps we can take to strengthen the
competitive position of all new entrants into the video marketplace. If
we succeed, consumers will enjoy lower prices, better service quality
and more choice.

                          ____________________
